Large-Scale Trade-Off Curve Computation for Incentive Allocation with Cardinality and Matroid Constraints

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August 30, 2025

Incentive allocation with constraints

A ride sharing company wants to send riders promotional coupons in the hope of more rides.



Image courtesy: ChatGPT-5

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Multiple-choice knapsack

Input: *n* sets of coupons $K_1, ..., K_n$. Each coupon $e \in K_i$ has a non-negative cost $c_{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\perp}$ and value $v_{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\perp}$. A positive budget $b \in \mathbb{Z}_{\perp}$.

Output: A subset of coupons K that maximizes the total value $\sum_{n \in K} v_n$ while satisfying $|K \cap K_i| \le 1$ and $\sum_{n \in K} c_n \le b$.

Multiple-choice knapsack

Input: n sets of coupons $K_1, ..., K_n$. Each coupon $e \in K_i$ has a non-negative cost $c_{\rho} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\perp}$ and value $v_{\rho} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\perp}$. A positive budget $b \in \mathbb{Z}_{\perp}$.

Output: A subset of coupons K that maximizes the total value $\sum_{\rho \in K} v_{\rho}$ while satisfying $|K \cap K_i| \le 1$ and $\sum_{\rho \in K} c_{\rho} \le b$.

Three problems with this formulation:

- 1. Finding the exact optimum is NP-hard. So we consider solving it approximately.
- 2. Companies may run multiple campaigns at the same time. So a trade-off curve between budget and profit will be useful.
- 3. The multiple-choice constraint $|K \cap K_i| \le 1$ is too strong for real-world applications.

Linear programming relaxation

Input: n sets of coupons K_1, \ldots, K_n . Each coupon $e \in K_i$ has a non-negative cost $c_e \in \mathbb{Z}_+$ and value $v_e \in \mathbb{Z}_+$. A positive budget $b \in \mathbb{Z}_+$.

Linear programming relaxation

Input: n sets of coupons $K_1, ..., K_n$. Each coupon $e \in K_i$ has a non-negative cost $c_a \in \mathbb{Z}_+$ and value $v_a \in \mathbb{Z}_+$. A positive budget $b \in \mathbb{Z}_{+}$

$$\tau(b) = \max_{x} \quad v \cdot x$$

$$s.t. \quad c \cdot x \le b$$

$$x_{K_{i}} \in P_{K_{i}} \quad \forall i \in [n]$$

Output: function $\tau(b)$ for $b \in (0, +\infty)$.

Linear programming relaxation

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$$s.t. \quad c \cdot x \le b$$

$$x_{K_{i}} \in P_{K_{i}} \quad \forall i \in [n]$$

Output: function $\tau(b)$ for $b \in (0, +\infty)$. We focus on 2 kinds of constraints of $X_{K} \in P_{K}$.

- 1. Cardinality. $X_{K_1} \in P_{K_2} \to \sum_{e \in K_1} X_e \le p$.
- 2. Matroid. $x_{K_i} \in P_{K_i} \rightarrow x_{K_i}$ is in the base polytope of a matroid M_i .

Results

We compute the curve $\tau(b)$ fast.

Theorem 1 Consider an incentive allocation problem with a total of m incentives. The trade-off curve is a piecewise linear concave function with k breakpoints.

- Cardinality constraint. $k = O(mp^{1/3})$ and τ can be computed in $O((k+m)\log m)$ time.
- Matroid constraint. $k = O(mr^{1/3})$ and τ can be computed in $O(Tk + k \log m)$ time.

Let's discuss this in detail at my poster!

#2001 Large-Scale Trade-Off Curve Computation for Incentive Allocation with Cardinality and Matroid Constraints

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Problem

We consider the incentive allocation problem with additional constraints.

Input: A set of coupons $E = \bigcup_i E_i$, where each coupon $e \in E$ has a value and a cost $v_e, c_e \in \mathbb{Z}_+$. Budget $B \in \mathbb{Z}_+$. Constraints \mathcal{F}_i on each subset E_i .

Output: A subset $X \subset E$ of coupons that maximizes the total value $\sum_{e \in X} v_e$ while satisfying the budget constraint $\sum_{e \in X} c_e \leq B$ and additional constraints $X \cap E_i \in \mathcal{F}_i$.

This problem is NP-hard. Consider its LP relaxation.

$$\tau(B) = \max_{x} v \cdot x$$

$$ct r \cdot v < R$$

Signature Function. Let $f_i(\lambda) = \max\{(v_{E_i} - \lambda c_{E_i})x|x \in \text{conv}(\mathcal{F}_i)\}$ be the signature function of agent i. The signature function is piecewise-linar and convex.

Theorem 4 $\tau(B)$ is piecewise-linear and concave. Computing $\tau(B)$ is straightforward if $f_i(\lambda)$ is known.

Finding $f_i(\lambda)$

Cardinality constraint. For fixed λ , computing $f_i(\lambda)=\max\{(v_{E_i}-\lambda c_{E_i})x\mid \mathbf{1}\cdot x\leq p\}$ is the same as finding the p largest coupons with respect to the weights $v_e-\lambda c_e$. If